The necessity of this special provision with respect to property and common rights or objects of the Confederate States is illustrated by the first sentence of the sixth article. This clause provides that “all debts, treaties and commitments entered into prior to the enactment of this Constitution shall be as valid to the United States under this government as they are under Confederation.” This provision, like the one we are discussing, was essential if the new constitution were adopted, the new government was not a simple change in a dynasty or in a form of government that left the nation or sovereignty equal and vested with all the rights and bound by all the obligations of the previous one. But when today`s United States emerged under the new administration, it was a new body politic, a new nation, which then took its place in the family of nations for the first time. It needed nothing by succession to Confederation. As its legal successor, it had no property or property rights that it had acquired and was not responsible for its obligations. The authors of the Constitution obviously saw it in this light. And since with the adoption of the Constitution in its former Confederate character, the various states would cease to exist and could not come together in that character, special provisions were essential to confer on the new government the property and rights they had in common at the time; and, at the same time, to give them the power to levy reasonable taxes and funds to settle the common debt they had incurred; and this power may be conferred on it only by special provisions of the Constitution. The U.S. territory and other property clause provided for the first clause and the last clause cited for the other.

They have nothing to do with the general powers and sovereignty rights conferred on the new government and cannot extend or diminish them. They were inserted to deal with the current state of emergency, not to regulate its powers as a government. The only two provisions that refer to them and include them treat them as property and make it the government`s duty to protect them; no other power is found with respect to this race in the Constitution; and since it is a government with delegated special powers, no power beyond these two provisions can be exercised constitutionally. The U.S. government had no right to interfere for any purpose other than to protect the rights of the owner and to leave it entirely to individual states to deal with this race, whether emancipated or not, as any state may think, which demands justice, humanity, the interests, and security of society. States apparently intended to reserve this power exclusively. Our communication on this part of the case will be very brief; the principle on which it is based was decided by this court, after careful consideration in Strader et al. v. Graham, reported in 10th Howard, p. 82. In this case, with the consent of the owner, the slaves had been taken from Kentucky to Ohio and then returned to Kentucky. And this court ruled that their status or condition, as free or slave, depended on the laws of Kentucky when they were sent back to that state, not Ohio; and that this court did not have the power to review the judgment of a State court on the basis of its own laws.

This is the point that was submitted directly to the court, and the decision that the court did not have jurisdiction revolved around it, as is clear from the report of the case. The situation of this population was completely different from that of the Indian race. The latter were not part of the colonial communities and never merged with them in social relations or in government. But although they were not civilized, they were a free and independent people, a people united in nations or tribes, governed by their own laws. Many of these political communities were located in areas where the white race claimed the ultimate right to govern. But this claim was recognized as subject to the right of the Indians to occupy it as long as they deemed it just, and neither the English nor the colonial government claimed or exercised dominion over the tribe or nation from which it was occupied, nor claimed the right to own the territory. until the tribe or nation agrees to cede it. These Indian governments were regarded and treated as foreign governments, as if an ocean had separated the red man from the white man; and their freedom has been constantly recognized from the time of the first emigration to the English colonies until today by the various governments that have succeeded one another.

Treaties were negotiated with them and their alliance was sought in the war; and the people who make up these Indian political communities have always been treated as foreigners who do not live under our government. It is true that the course of events brought native American tribes within the borders of the United States under the white race; And it was deemed necessary, both for them and for us, to consider them to be in a state of discipleship and, to some extent, to enact laws about them and the territory they occupy. But they can, without a doubt, like the subjects of any other foreign government, be naturalized by the authority of Congress and become citizens of a state and the United States; And if an individual left his nation or tribe and settled among the white population, he would be entitled to all the rights and privileges that would belong to an emigrant of any other foreign people. But with this objection, we believe that the special and limited jurisdiction of the courts of the United States has not been announced. This special and limited jurisdiction has made it necessary to adopt in those jurisdictions rules and principles of writing different from those governed by the common law courts in England and in the different States of the Union which have adopted the common law rules. It is difficult today to discern the state of public opinion regarding this unfortunate race that prevailed in civilized and enlightened parts of the world at the time of the Declaration of Independence and when the United States Constitution was formulated and adopted. But the public history of every European nation shows this in a way that is too simple to be wrong. Well, as we said in a previous part of this statement, the property right of a slave is clearly and explicitly affirmed on another point of the Constitution. The right to act with it, as an ordinary element of property and property. has been guaranteed to citizens of the United States, in any state that may wish, for twenty years.

And the government is expressly obliged to protect them in all future times if the slave escapes its owner. This is done with simple words – too simple to be misunderstood. And there is not a word in the Constitution that gives confession greater power over the property of slaves or entitles the right to such property unless protected than property of any other nature. The only power transferred is the power that comes with the duty to protect and protect the owner in his rights. During the hearing of the jury in this case, in order to maintain the problems on his part, the plaintiff read the following agreed statement of facts to the jury (see agreement above). No further testimony before the jury was given by either party. The plaintiff then ordered the court to give the jury the following direction, namely: Prior to the commencement of this action, Scott filed a motion for release in The St. County of Louis Circuit Court (State Court), where there was a verdict and verdict in his favor. Due to an error in the state Supreme Court, the following judgment was overturned and the case was sent back to the Circuit Court, where it was filed to await the decision of the case now in question. To this plea, there was a Demurrer in the usual form, which was pleaded in April 1854, when the court decided that the Demurrer should be maintained. Nor was it used in reference to the African breed imported or born in that country; because Congress did not have the power to naturalize them, and therefore there was no need to use certain words to exclude them.

Consideration of this passage in this case would be more appropriate if, in another part of this declaration, we examine the power that Congress can exercise constitutionally in a territory over the human rights or property rights of a citizen. But as is the case in the same case with the passage we commented on earlier, we now have it that it will save the Court from having to refer to the case again. And if you read the page where this sentence is located, you will see that it has no reference to congressional power over human rights or property rights – but refers entirely to the power to establish courts to administer laws passed by the Constitution and define the jurisdiction they can exercise. However, it seems. to assume that there is a difference between the ownership of a slave and other property, and that different rules may be applied to it when explaining the Constitution of the United States. And the laws add the customs of nations, and the writings of eminent jurists on the relationship between master and slave and their mutual rights and duties, and the powers that governments can exercise over them, have been covered in the argument. The erroneous plaintiff, who was also a plaintiff in the next court, was held as a slave with his wife and children by the defendant in the State of Missouri; and he brought this action in the U.S. Circuit Court for that district to claim title to freedom of himself and his family.